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CHAPTER13 
DEMOCRATIC 
SCAFFOLDING FORA 
GLOBALIZING AGE 
PEYI SOYINKA-AIREWELE 
The ordinary people of Africa •... want independence from 
leaders whose misrule has intensified their poverty and exploi­
tation to the point of being life-threatening. And they are con­
vinced that they cannot now get material improvement without 
securing political empowerment and being better placed to 
bring public policy closer to social needs ..• A deeper commit­
ment to democracy will encourage even development." 
-Claude Ake1 
Adecade ago, Christopher Clapham and John Wiseman had profferedwhat they described as an "unromantic and pragmatic view" of the 
prospects of democracy in Africa, specifically suggesting that a realistic 
notion of the political systems evolving in Africa should be closer to the 
minimalist end of the spectrum than the maximalist end.2 Nevertheless, 
even their controversilll call for a practicable version (in the sense of a 'rough 
and ready' one) rather than an ideologically idealistic model requires public 
contestation of power, in which a universally enfranchised citizenry would 
make their choice through a regular electoral process operating on the basis 
of political goods such as freedom of association and expression, the rule of 
law, and with a judiciary free from government control and abuse.3 
Citation: Peyi Soyinka-Airewele, "Democratic Scaffolding for a Globalizing Age," in Socio-
Political Scaffolding and the Construction of Change: Constitutionalism and Democratic 
Governance in Africa. Kelechi Kalu and Peyi Soyinka-Airewele, eds. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World 
Press. 2009. 
Amidst such ongoing debates about transitional goals, we cannot afford 
to lose sight of Ake's reminder that much of the popular drive for political 
reforms in Africa takes its bearings from the hope that the removal of 
repressive or. unresponsive governments will generate rapid an� palpable 
changes in the socio-economic conditions of the people. In such a context, 
proposals for change must be armed with a capacity to engender an active 
practice of transforming relations of power, domination and injustice. A tall 
order indeed. Yet the price of the failure to achieve this is tragically appar­
ent in the growing ease with which governments are able to recruit large 
numbers of a frustrated and economically destitute populace in support of 
unconscionable policies that manipulate cleavages within the polity. 
Consequently, I employ the concept of democratic development in 
my conversation around socio-political scaffolding to express a movement 
away from the notion of a minimalist procedural democracy in the sense 
of a focus on dectoral and political liberalization processes but also away 
from the notion of economic development, narrowly defined in terms 
of economic growth and infrastructural development. Rather, I wish to 
invoke the intricate relationship between the goals of social, economic and 
political transformation and the integrated framework for empcn_vering 
people to define, devise and demand the means of meeting their social and 
economic ·needs. As such, the process of democratic development involves 
a range of practices that enhance and broaden the range and application 
of civil and political rights, equal opportunity to resources, and claims to 
voice and democratic space. Conceptualizing democratic development as 
an integral aspect of political transitions and engineering suggests that 
we cannot define African politics in caricatures of dictatorial state power, 
whilst ignoring the tangible essence of struggle, resistance and the con­
stant re-articulation of pressing socio-political and economic. concerns 
by diverse populations. It also suggests that we must seek to capture the 
domestic and external factors that shape the political processes emerging 
across the c;ontinent. Our failure to capture and expose the nuanced arenas 
that define the directions and outcomes of political transitions in Africa 
rob us of the capacity to challenge, prescribe and transform such realities. 
A recent publication on Africa featured on its cover, a map that 
des� African countries in pithy word concepts-"personal_ ru1e•, 
"socialism", "state collapse", "predatory ru1e•, "Islam" etc. 4 Such handy terms 
that seek to describe the dominant characteristic of the state often obscure 
the complexity of social, economic, religious, cultural and other factors that 
shape. the agendas and characteristics of African countries, their public 
spaces and the engagement of state and citizenry. Rather, they allow the 
reader to conceptualize African societies as existing in some form of politi-
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cal rigor mortis, rigidified and transfixed into resistant alien political forms 
devoid of democratic notions. 
While the use of these terms might well respond to the search for 
new ways of outdoing the other in expressing horror about the African 
dilemma, such labels often succeed only in eroding the complexity of 
struggles over rights and power that have been a part of the political reality 
of most African societies. There is no simple trajectory of politics and gov­
ernance in the continent. African countries are not mere repositories of 
state brutality and repression, but have longstanding histories of popular 
democratic voice and resistance that have facilitated democratic transitions 
in many countries including Nigeria and Togo, as well as state failure in 
more extreme cases like Somalia, Liberia and Ethiopia. 
Such evidence of societal democratization is particularly· poignant 
when we consider the political contradictions of unexpected reversals in 
countries like the Gambia and Togo, in which in the first instance, a 1994 
military coup d'etat reversed almost 3 decades of established electoral tra­
ditions in the Gambia, while in the case of Togo, popular resistance and 
continental political pressures terminated the attempt to continue "per­
sonalist family rule" through the handover of political power to erstwhile 
president Houphuet Boigny's son. 5
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for African states however is 
the f_act that these domestic struggles for change must occur within the 
ambit of a globalizing world that offers both opportunity and challenge to 
the process of democratic transitions and effective governance in Africa. 
In this chapter, I re-examine the nature and trajectory .of political transi­
tions in the continent and then highlight the interface between domestic 
and extema1 politics of democratic development and their implications for 
political transitions and governance in Africa. 
The process of"democratizing" in a "globalizing" age opens a cauldron 
of questions and concerns that African scholars and activists will need to 
continue to address with some urgency. We must ask, what really are the 
most salient contributions of global and local institutions to the emergence 
of a culture of rights, to the process of individual, social and intellectual 
growth and capacity building? And how does the conflicted identity of 
post-colonial institutions and the socio-cultural and global context within 
which they function ultimately impact the meanings and concrete experi­
ences of oppression, empowerment and rights? 
In the African continent, the process of consolidating political voice 
and democratic processes, through the transformation of political, social, 
economic, legal, educational and administrative sites, structures and rela­
tions is fraught with contradictions. On one hand, domestic wlnerabilities 
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and the larger impact of a 'triumphal market theology' have generated an 
environment of extreme social and economic distress for many. The signs 
of material, socio-psychological and physical distress are easily observed, 
On the other hand, the reality of tangible material rewards creates a logical 
thrust for the continuation of global market alliances by key stakeholders. 
Thus the struggles over democratic voice and structures are impacted by 
the pressures of a globalizing process that reinforces both political repres­
sion and empowerment. 6 
TRANSITIONAL WAVES OR DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESSES? CHALLENGES TO A GLOBAL 
IMAGINARY 
The notion of waves of democratic transition evoke an unfortunate 
dual symbolism in its metaphoric conceptualization of tidal waves, which 
obviously do not merely fiow, but inevitably ebb. This unfortunate imagery popularized in Samuel Huntington's jaundiced appraisal has become one 
of the dominant modes of analyzing politics in Africa and other 'Third 
world regions specifically in terms of state level political changes and broad 
regional trends. Thus, Crawford Young had described Africa's waves of 
democratization as consisting of first, constitutional changes that followed 
the decolonization struggles and thus heralded a transition from the dicta­
torial systems of the colonial system to models of'democratic constitution­
alism' typically copied from those same powers; and then of a short lived 
and "feeble" second wave that in the 1970s and early 1980s had threatened 
the trend toward a concentration of power in the postcolonial state.7
Young argues that the transient changes of the so-called second wave, 
brought about a number of defining transitions in the continent: "three of 
the bloodiest and most notorious tyrants- !di Amin ofUganda,Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa of the Central African Republic and Francisco Macias Nguema 
of Equatorial Guinea-were deposed" and Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, 
Senegal all experienced various political changes that seemed to challenge 
the dominant rules of the game. 8 
There has been popular assent to this notion that Africa's third wave 
ensued in the late 1980s on the heels of a broad "wave" of democratic 
change sweeping the Third World. Such a view gained potency particularly 
when contextualized within the arena of specinc changes in the global 
political economy created by the ebbing power and reach of the Soviet 
Union and the aggressive policy changes and international climate of the 
economic reform programs dictated by the international financial regimes 
represented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
These trends certainly occurred alongside the expansion of some visible 
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much of the continent. 
However, we must re-open the_ question of w� these political 
changes of the so-called "third wave"' can be deUnked from those invoked 
as representing the "second wavr!' or in fact from what constitutes tho 
continued socio-political · redefinitions of the domestic political ter:rafu.
It is vit:al that we note the continuity of democratizing struggles on tha 
African landscape, � of the interjections of more propitious
global political and economic changes. Young forinstance, argued that the 
'popular welcome that greeted the Nigerian military intervention of late 
1983 marked the end of the second wave"', but what he terms a "popular 
welcome"' was not in any way an endorsement of an end to 'democracy' or 
popular preference for autocratic militarism.9 In fact, it was a very transient
pronouncement of collective judgment on a corrupt and unresponsive gov­
ernment and best understood not as the death toll on democracy, but as 
part of a continuing dynamic process of popular voice decrying the experi­
ence of political corruption, lack of accountability and subversion of the 
electoral process by the incumbents. 
We must also remember that the process of nee-liberal global eco­
nomic restructuring that presumably generated the third 'WfJ'UI was in fact 
already underway across the continent. Furthermore, the Algerian riots of 
1988 and crises in other states in the late 1980s to 1990s were underlaid 
by clear patterns of pre-existing socio-economic grievances and coups in 
many African countries. The real question is why these extant,pattems of 
social and political resistance gave birth to particular political transitions at 
some points in African post-independence history and it is this question 
that is partly answered by the discussions of the ebbing power and collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and the expansion of the triumphalist neoliberal ide­
ology marketed by powerful international financial institutions and global 
corporate agencies etc. 
It is within such frames that one can find any value in the concept of 
waves of transition that occurred at particular intersections of local and 
global political economy, to wit, the success of liberation struggles in the 
1960s, the challenges to centralized power structures of the 1970s and 
1980s and the continuation of those struggles in the 1990s and beyond. 
I use the word continuation advisedly, as a means of highlighting the 
fact that popular conceptualizations and demands for civil and political 
rights and economic changes did not radically change at any period in 
between the much vaunted "democratization waves". It is imperative that 
as we re-envision the future of governance and transitions in Africa, we 
call attention to the need to redefine the meanings of such democratizing 
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To put it baldly, such an assumption of an ebb tide in democratizing 
processes in Africa is worrisome for it insists that we adopt a restricted 
understanding of democracy as we respond to the critical question of why 
certain struggles become pertinent or translate into change at some point 
in history or the other. For instance, while it has been claimed that Western 
globalizing regimes compelled economi� and political liberalization in 
third world debtor states, which presumably translated into the third wave 
of democratization, such claims are problematic as they simultaneously 
neutralize our concern with the role of these same global forces in ignor­
ing, destabilizing and invalidating the democratizing political processes 
underway in many African countries. 
From the saga of Lumumba's Congo, to the repeated US protection 
of Zaire's dictator Mobutu and strategic accommodation with Nigeria's 
General.Abacha,African realities remind us in factthat we are often dealing 
with a discourse of illusions in which the concept of waves of democracy 
in African countries responds most tangibly to Euro-centered concerns 
and willingness to validate the processes underway in the continent only 
at specific historical junctures. 'Ihcy also reflect a basic confilct over how to 
capture, define and conceptualize the process of democratic becoming. 
Has I argue here, the social mobilizations, resistance and struggles of 
the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s were all part of the formation of the political 
terrain that anchors state level changes in the democratization process of 
nations, we cannot afford to ignore these critical processes in favor of a 
'wave' conceptualization of democracy that only recognizes the incursion 
of electioneering procedures and competitive party politics as the notable 
episodes of democracy. Electoral processes constitute- the most overt and 
visible forms of procedural democracy particularly to outside observers, as 
they signal important changes from an old regime to a new, but we must 
maintain a holistic view of the social and economic arenas in which demo­
cratic development processes in Africa are birthed and sustained outside 
of that fluctuating tide of electioneering change. 
RE-THINKING THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
GLOBALIZATION FOR POUTICS IN AFRICA 
We don't care who buys our [copper] mines just as long as the 
mines make money and contribute to the exchequer. 
-Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, World Economic
Forum, Harare, May 199'71° 
Globalizing forces unleash disquieting questions for Africa. The tur­
bulent political economy of a continent engulfed in a web of complex and 
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often contradictory impulses generated by a changing global order are 
well demonstrated in Africa today. Unfortunately, the popular struggles 
for democracy and development in Africa threaten to be the victims in 
the reconstitution of the glob� imperative, at least in the short term. But 
not inevitably so, for the African situation is fraught with ambiguities: on 
one hand, a renewed civil society strengthening the trend towards democ­
racy and demands for socio-economic devclopment:11 •••• and on the other
hand, the uneasy alliance between a number of African go�ents and 
the global econo� forces that herald the growing functional integration 
of the world. Trends viewed by many as reinfo� the marginalization, 
impoverishment and trivialization of democratic processes in much of 
Africa and by others as opening up unprecedented opportunities for socio­
political ana economic change.12 
.AJ:. a time, it seemed self-evident that many African governments gen­
erally resisted the economic regimes rooted in classical economic liberalism 
and imposed by the major industrial powers through multilateral economic 
institutions. Indeed a common complaint by international financial .insti­
tutions was that African countries were running from the world economy 
while looking for an easy shortcut to development 13 On the contrary, the 
last two decades have witnessed the emergence of coalitions between an 
increasing nwnber of African governments and the forces of economic 
globalization. Ndulu, van de Walle and colleagues argued that a theoreti­
cal consensus emerged in the development policy community during the 
late 1980s to 1990s about the explanations for Africa's economic aisis 
and the prerequisites of renewed growth there.14 'This theoretical shift 
continues to hold sway today emphasizing the inadequacy of internal 
structures and conditions necessary for neo-liheral economic reforms as 
against the historical or structural explanations of underdevelopment. The 
priorities and 'tradeo:ffs' facing African governments that became commit­
ted to this 'consensus' were to include among other things, the adoption of 
outward-oriented strategies and policies to facilitate access to international 
markets, exchange, and investment and the acceptance that donor support 
will be extended increasingly on1y to governments that have demonstrated 
'good behavior,' defined largely as adherence to the emerging consensus on 
neo-liberal reform programs.15 
AB in other developing regions, globalization is frequently described as 
presenting African countries with significant opportunities for initiating 
and managing change.16 But the evidence clearly demonstrates that the 
imposition of neoliberal market reforms have been attended by growing 
impoverishment, deepening socio-economic inequalities, rural-urban 
migrations, growth of slums, worsening health crises, increasing levels of 
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crime and violence, social unrest and political dest:abilization. In spite of 
this we are faced with the current reality of the scramble by many gov­
ernments to secure concessions in the evolving global political economy. 
Claude Ake captures this aspect of economic globalization in rather cynical 
yet accurate terms, as the "march of capi1:al all over the world 1n search of 
profit1t17 and in this context, several leaders have continued to attract sub­
stantial foreign capi1:al while in complete defiance of domestic and foreign 
pressures for political reform. The allure of natural resources such as gold, 
oil and diamonds obviously outweigh the problems of political violence, 
repression, corruption �d dense bureaucratization. 
For instance, at the Edinburgh meeting of the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government 1n October 1997, an economic theme was adopted for the 
first time ever. Focusing on trade and investment (the "Road to Common­
wealth Prosperity"), the body adopted a joint declaration that emphasized 
the opportunities of global economic glohalization. AB several observers 
pointed out, with the emphasis on trade and investment, issues related to 
democratization and human rights came a poor second. Thus, it was not 
surprising that the organization did not follow through on its threat to 
expel Nigeria, for instance, if it continued to flout the principles outlined 
in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991- namely democracy, 
good governance, BUBtainable development, respect for human rights and 
fundamen1:al freedoms.18 
The bold intransigence of the Nigerian government must be weighed 
alongside the met that a group of British corporations with major interests in 
Nigeria openly lobbied their government before and during the conference. 
Specifically, they requested that the British government refrain from impos­
ing any sanctions on the Nigerian government as it was "hard enough doing 
business in Nigeria. "19 A decade later, efforts to compel the government of 
Zimbabwe to accede to popular struggles for change were limited by similar 
concerns. 'Through the ascendancy of economic and strategic imperatives 
in place of the geo-politics of the cold war period, the structure of state 
authoritarianism in a world of cloven globalization is further entrenched. 
From collapsed states such as Somalia, states with public authority but 
a high degree of political instability such as Nigeria and Zaire, to countries 
that can claim a stable civil environment and are today moving toward 
more open and contested political systema20 the phenomenon of savvy 
leaders and the disquieting political scenarios evoked by their ingenious 
responses to the demands of an economically driven global system is of 
particular importance at a period in post-Cold War global society when 
Africa's democratic renewal supposedly has the greatest chance of attract­
ing international support.21
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Callaghy once reports his conversation with a Western business execu­
tive who at a point retorts; "Who cares about Af� it is not important to 
us; leave it to the IMF and the World Bank. "22 So today, the �tic efforts 
bj, China, the U.S and other western states to reenter the African conti­
nent as allies of the "new gulf oil states" indicates perhaps 'another tide in 
global interest in Africa. The changing global political economy in which 
political struggles in countries like Angola, Nigeria, the Sudan, Gabon, 
Chad, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe and Guinea will occur in the 
future will be �fined largely by global interest in African oil and other 
resources.Jean-Chrisophe Servant reports that although the United States 
used to attach little importance to Africa, now it is reviewing its oil sources 
strategy. Sub-Saharan Africa, with its good quality reserves, could well 
account for �ty-:five percent of all US crude oil imports by 2015.23 
Over the past few yea.rs, a cascade of reports and news items, obscured 
from the attention of the western public make it quite clear that several 
African countries are being redefined in global geo-strategic calculus as 
the "new gulf' or the "Kuwait of Africa". Richard Wall's scathing com­
mentary is representative of the apprehensions of many observers: 
Against a backdrop of politically correct self-flagellation by 
a bemused [US] president who has told us that "Africa is a 
nation that suffers from incredible disease" ... and the perceived 
need for a generous spreading of liberal social-democracy, West 
Africa has all the ingredients for righteous intervention by the 
empire in its on-going pursuit ofbenevolent global hegemony ••.. 
It is-not hard to fathom that P43 [US President George Bush 
Jr.] and his i:ntourage, who visited Nigeria and other countries 
on their recent whirlwind tour of Africa, were really on another 
mission altogether. For at the end of this rainbow of opportunity 
for humanitarian interventionists, weapons manufacturers and 
self-appointed experts in 'good governance' - lies the glittering 
prize of all prizes: black oil. 24 
And again ... 
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African oil is of national strategic interest to us," said Assis­
tant Secretary of State for Africa and former Scowcroft group 
member Walter H. K.ansteiner III at aJanuary 2002 symposium 
on African oil held in Washington DC and organized by the 
Institute for Advanced Political and Strategic Studies (IASPS) 
... which in 1996 brought us Richard Perle's "A Clean Break: 
A New Strategy For Securing The Realm." This organization 
has been at the forefront of successful attempts to persuade 
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the United States P43 administration that it needs to divcnlfy 
its sources of oil supply, and move away from the 'unfriendly' 
old gulf (that's the Persian gulf) to exploit the 'new gulf'-the 
gulf of Guinea in West Africa. Wrica ..• ,. said congressional 
Sub-Committee on Africa chairman Rep. Ed Royce CR-Cali-
fornia) at the same event, "is less of a long-term threat in terms 
of our dependency on foreign oil. It is very difficult to imagine 
a Saddam Hussein in Africa. •• I think African oil should be 
treated as a priority for U.S. national security post-9/11, and I 
think that post 9/11 it has occurred to all of us that our tradi-
tional sources of oil are not as secure as we once thought they 
were..25 
Servant also insists that other discrete interventions in oil-produc­
ing African countries seem to corroborate the trend, not:ably U.S support 
for peace talks in Sudan at the beginning of 2002 and gentle pressure on 
Nigeria to leave OPEC, Colin Powell's visit to Gabon, the first visit for a 
US secretary of state, President George Bush's symbolic breakfast party for 
10 heads of state from central Africa, the visit by General Carlton Fulford, 
US military command in Europe, to Sao Tome and Principe to review 
the security of oil operators in the Gulf of Guinea and the possibility of 
setting up a regional military cnmroand centre there, similar to the one in 
South Korea. 26 The reason for the growing interest in Africa is not hard to
un� he argues, as sub-Saharan Africa already produces as much as 
Iran, Venezuela and Mexico combined with expected massive increases in 
output by oil producers such as Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. 
African reserves are already attracting major investments by European and 
US companies with some acerbic competition emerging as some European 
countries defend their interest against new US entrants.27
Of even greater allure are the p olitical advantages. Roger Diwan, a 
managing director of the Petroleum Fmance Company explained that 
"there is a long-term strategy from the US government to weaken OPEC's 
hold on the market and one way to do that is to peel off certain countries." 
None of these new gulf oil states, apart from Nigeria, was a member of 
OPEC, and Robert Murphy, a state department adviser on Africa makes 
their appeal clear: "Much of West Africa's oil is offshore, insulated from 
domestic political or social turmoil. Political discord or dispute in African 
oil states is unlikely to take on a regional or ideological tone that would 
result in a joint embargo by suppliers at once. "28
The implications are disturbing and portend a new wave in Western 
influence in African politics and governance with increases in US defense 
attaches and proposals for securing African oil from "terrorism." Richard 
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Wall notes that the tiny two-island state of Sao Tome e Principe was ear­
marked by U.S strategists as a possible location for the regional homeport 
. of a future US Forces Southern Atlantic sub-command in a list of regional 
security recommendations of the African Oil Policy Initiative Grc;,up's 
2002 white paper ••• which also suggested that "a US-Nigerian compact on 
regional security issues should be established to make the area more secure 
and thereby more attractive for direct foreign investment. "2!1 Today, the US 
has embarked on systematic diplomatic and econo�c overtures to African 
governments to convince leaders and their citizens to buy into the now 
established US military command for Africa.-
Commentators continue to decry the fact that since 1996 the U.S. has 
emerged as the largest foreign investor in Equatorial Guinea with Exxon/ 
Mobil and Hess among corporations· engaged in large-scale off-shore 
production, leading to an astounding gross domestic product growth that 
supported the repressive and corrupt regime of President Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mbasogo. Kevin Clark for instance argues: 
Shamcfully, it appears that as long as he is willing to provide a nc:w pipeline to the U.S., the Bush administration, which has 
strong ties to many of the major corporate players in Equatorial 
Guinea, is content to hold its nose and stick out its hand. 1here 
is talk in Washington about beginning military training pro­
grams or establishing a new navy command .... Like an addict whose illness compels the same hurtful patterns and disfigur­ing decisions, the U.S. stands again on an oil-addled precipice. 
We can either take that first hard step and admit our collective 
problem with oil or we can begin the cycle one more time in 
West Africa, supporting a totalitarian kleptocracy that will keep 
the spigots open even as it keeps a heavy boot on the democratic aspirations ofits own people.30 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE 
IN AFRICA 
Regardless of one's predilection for particular forms of democracy, 
it is apparent that even the most minimalist form of democracy today 
must occur within the constricting interstices of a globalizing age, which 
Kennedy described a long time ago as the "coalescence of varied transna­
tional processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, 
culture, and ideology Qf one country to penetrate another"31• Paradoxically,
those powerful market forces, international financial institutions, industrial 
states, international non-governmental organizations and the network of 
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internationally engaged individuals and groups that presage such changes 
are the same forces joined in the discourse over the trajectory of political 
struggles in Africa. All too often, they intervene to define the nature and 
use of power, governance, protest and authority in African countries.32
'Ihe popular notion of globalization as constituting some form of a 
benign global villagization has been taken to task by the late African polit­
ical t1cientist Professor Claude Ake who argued that what is being global­
ized is "not Yoruba but English, not Turkish pop culture but American, not 
Seneg-alese technology but Japanese and German. Globalization is then an 
ongoing process of ambiguous homogenization as well as a crystallization 
of power and hierarcbization of the global order".33 Holm and Sorensen
have forwarded a nuanced view of these intertwined processes as they 
affect the third world, descr.ibing it as uneven globaliza1;ion in which the 
intensification· of economic, political, social and cultural relations aaoss 
borders ••• is uneven in both intensity and geographical scope, in both the 
international and domestic dimension.34 
In spite of such variegation, the literature highlights the dramatic 
outcome of the political subordination of national systems to international 
economic and political actors and processes. The implications are dire and 
suggest that socio-economic globalintion may serve to consolidate the 
existing global and, domestic �chies and structuration of power. No 
wonder that with specific reference to the African continent, Ake argued 
urgently for a vibrant participatory democracy that empowers the ordinary 
African politlcally, socially and economically as the most critical politlcal 
response to globalization. 
But his view runs counter to an often unspoken global persuasion that 
continues to perceive of participatory democracy as a luxury in a continent 
beset by grievous economic ills. The reasoning is simple, globalization will 
presumably increase the markets, resources and technologies awilable for 
development if African governments increase their capacity to implement 
key policies and take advantage of the opportunities that present them­
selves. 35 Since much of this capacity building and ultimate regime viability
will require substantial painful market reform, an implicit understanding 
has evolved over time around a "need" to de-prioritize political liberal­
ization and democratization in Third World development. For instance, 
against the backdrop of Asian economic growth and just prior to the col­
lapse of those "Tiger" economies in the crises of 1997, Monshipouri had 
concluded, in some affinity perhaps with those who call euphemistically 
for the installation of "market democracies" that: 
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In the long run, the main concern need not be the promotion 
of more stable democracies in the Third World, but rather the 
creation of conditions that can 8U8tain a steady transition. 1he 
importance of properly planned structural adjustment must not 
be underemphasized. Furthermore, since building democracy 
and a free market at the same time may be impracticable in 
tumultuous Third World politics, it may be necessary to afford 
economic liberalization a higher priority than democratiza­
tlon.36 
A decade later, Bhagwati affirmed the same philosophy in even stronger 
terms. In his "defense of globalizationn, Bhagwati asks "why are the critics 
of globalization agitated? What bothers them?,,To answer his own quest 
tions, he categorizes the critics as comprising two main groups that need to 
be distinguished. 
Fll"St there is a multitude of hard-core protestors who have deep 
seated antipathy to globalization ... .many of them buy into a 
linked trilogy of discontents that take the form successively 
of an ethos composed of an anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, 
and acute anti-corporation mind-set .... beyond understand­
ing where their discontents come from, as I do presently, there 
is little that one can do to enter into a dialogue with them. 
Second, however, there are the critics of globalization whose 
discontents are well within the parameters of mainstream 
dissent and discourse .... These critiques, which amount in my 
view to a gigantic non sequitur, are of a very different order from 
the hard-core criticisms ... and need an extended and careful 
response. I provide that .... by demonstrating that, in fact, the 
various social causes that we all embrace, such as advancement 
of gender equality and reduction of poverty, are advanced, not 
set back, by globalization.37 
Such views have not gone unchallenged. Osvaldo Sunkel for instance 
argues that one of the consequences of globalization is a generalized 
worldwide economic reform trend toward the dismantling of the public 
sector which led to economic growth and social development in the postwar 
period and that in contrast to the core industrialized nations, where many 
protectionist practices and barriers (national or regional) remain 
untouched, wholesale, intense reforms have occurred mainly in global 
peripheral economies in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Eastern Eur,ope 
with major external and domestic configurations. 38 While liberal market 
reforms, a key part of the contemporary political-economic dispensations
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in Africa, might represent a concern for competitive efficiency and eco­
nomic growth, numerous studies reveal that these processes often engen­
der a bierachization of power in the international system and c:xacerbate 
inst'ability in the Third World. Indeed, Adebayo Adecltji, former executive 
director of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), concluded 
that globalization will only exacerbate poverty in Africa.39 
Clearly the global environment introduces a cascade of contradic­
tory issues for political struggles in Africa, including the phenomenon 
of regimes committed to implementing market reforms and seeking to 
attract global capital for reasons of economic and political expediency. Such 
accommodation or adaptation to the 'new era? of international business is 
not a .consequence of ignorance about their implications for the aggrava­
tion of inequalities and fragmentation, diminution of state sovereignty, or 
Zuma "deficit in the capacity to govern."40 Neither does it reflect a pro­
found belief in that idealized.prospect of a globalized society without war, 
"a world where states to an increasing degree are enmeshed in structures 
in which both individuals and non-state institutions are of importance"' in 
which notions of hegemony become increasingly irrelevant and economic 
inequalities are gradually eradicated as the state gives way to the logic of 
the market. 41 
ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES AND THE LANDSCAPE OF 
SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUGGLES 
Within the continent itself; there is a perception that accommoda­
tion to the global political economy is among other reasons, an effort to 
recapture external legitimacy by leaders besieged by strong internal oppo­
sition. The appeal to the external for legitimacy is not a new phenomenon, 
but hitherto it was largely binged on the logic of cold war politics. In the 
present dispensation, it may be the politics of international economics or 
of global 'terrorism". For instance, in an address to the chief executives of 
the Nigerian private sector in 1991, erstwhile military dictator, General 
Babangida 'humorously' addressed the corporate chiefs as "Co-Directors 
of'Nigeria Incorporated', the pivotal organization under which the search 
for national economic transformation would henceforth be sustained. 42 
Popular suspicions in the country about the political and diplomatic impli­
cations of his economic reform programs rapidly inspired intense domestic 
criticism and opposition. By the time the incoming regime of General 
Sani Abacha renewed this search for accommodation with forces of the 
free market through privatization programs, several analysts responded 
with scathing rejoinders: 
373 
Peyi Soyinka-.Airewele 
We are back to the same swan-song in General Sani Abacha's 
newfangled economic policy the so called Vision 2010. Under­
pinning this latest attempt to sell yet another dummy to Nige­
rians is the asswnption that all that is needed to keep Nigerian& 
quiet and happy •.. to &ucce&&fully ambush the popular clamor 
for a return to democratic rule is to pursue Babangida'& policy 
to it& logical conclusion. Sell off the nation's refineries, introduce 
tuition in the universities, privatize the remaining banks-in 
short sell off Nigeria to the highest bidder and then sit back and 
hope the new" entrepreneurs", pursuing the profit motive, will 
run Nigeria PLC profitably and efficiently for the benefit of all. 
But all these can not be achieved in an atmosphere of 'political 
agitation'.43 
In seeming response to such protestations, at the tum of the millen­
nium,African Ministers at a conference organized by the Economic Com­
mission for Africa (ECA) had issued the following statement, "confronted 
with the relentless march of global competition, Africa must intensify its 
economic reforms, boost domestic savings and investment, and expand 
foreign traµe. 44 Yet for two decades, the World Bank itself had professed 
awareness of the need to align economic dictates with political empower­
ment. For instance, the 1989 World Bank report; "From Crisis to Sustain­
able Development", acknowledged that political and economic reforms in 
Africa must seek to empower ordinary people to take charge of their lives, 
to make communities more responsible for their development and to make 
governments listen to their people. 
African scholars, however are all too cognizant of the contradictory 
and specious nature ofWorld Bank's exhortations. Alidou's stinging indict­
ment of the Bank's "African Capacity Building Initiative" (ACBI) built on 
the writings of numerous scholars such as George Caffentzis, in describ­
ing its devastating effects, "its implicit devaluation of the African intel­
lect," promotion of Africa's dependence on foreign agencies and "donors"; 
and failure to recognize that the collapse of the African university system 
for instance, is itself a direct consequence of the World Bank and IMF 
structural adjustment programs.45
The implications are myriad. With specific reference to democracy, 
Baeg begins with an analysis of the debate raging between what he calls 
neo-liberal optimists and pessimists. The former argue that because capi­
talism and democracy share an organizing principle-that decentralized 
exchanges between producers and consumers (capitalism) or between 
politicians and voters (democracy) produce an efficient allocation of goods 
and services, or political power--capitalism and democracy are mutually 
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reinforcing. In contrast, so-called "pessimilltB" argue that the benefits of 
globalization are distributed unevenly between advanced capitalist coun­
tries and dcvc1oping countries and that this imbalance will destabilize the 
new democracies of the 'Third World. 46 
It was in this vein that Steven Volle disputed the common assumption 
in Western political discourse, that democracy is the characteristic political 
form of capitalism and that the unrestrained operation of the markets for 
capital and labor constitutes the material base of democracy. He warned 
that empirical evidence clearly suggests that what is important is the "class 
nexus between development and democracy. It is the transforIQation of 
class structures which permits the strengthening of the working arul middle 
classes and the weakening of the landed upper classes.• To the contrary, an 
overview of African countries suggests that in much of the continent, the 
global political economy has impoverished and weakened the middle and 
working classes while intensifying the concentration of power and -wealth 
within a small elite class,47 
'NEW'AFRICANLEADERSANDPOUTICAL 
TRANSITIONS 
'The term 'new1 is hardly the most accurate appellation for leaders such 
as the former President Rawlings of Ghana or Yoweri Musevcni ofUganda 
who stayed in power in various guises for over a decade. Yet they were 
described in the.international media and by a variety of Western leaders 
and policy makers as heralds of a new generation of African leadership. 
The term 'new' was used in the sense that irrespective of their uidividual 
political and ideological proclivities they were deemed to represent an 
emerging crop of economically savvy and enlightened African leaders 
with an avowed commitment to neo-liberal economic reforms. Having 
tenaciously adhered to the structural adjustment policies of international 
financial institutions and in some cases restored a semblance of stability to 
war ravaged countries; it came as no surprise that their equivocal attitude 
to democratization was received by a rather "humbled" silence in global 
arena. News reports on Africa in the late 1990s are illuminating: 
The president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, has become the 
darling of major international donors such as the World Bank 
and the United States •..• On her recent trip to East and Central 
Africa, Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright called him 
"a beacon of hope". A proponent of the so-called Asian model 
of development, Museveni believes that in "pre-industrialn soci­
eties such as his, economic strength must precede democratic 
growth. His attention to Uganda's economy has made it among 
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Africa's strongest this decade, with consistent growth rates of 
5 percent and abme. "Liberal democracy grows hand in hand 
with industrialization," he says. "Pulitical change is the roof. •. 
the economy is the foundation." For many critics, such talk harks 
back to the Cold War, when the West often traded off leaders' 
democratic shortcomings for ideological loy.tlty. Many analysts 
believe that policy strengthened despots and contributed to the 
enervating instability that has blanketed the mntinent for much 
of the past tlm:e decades. They fear that the West may again be
treading the same path.48 
While these leaders were often greeted with such acclamation, com­
mentators such as Buckley, in an article titled "Autl1ority's Changing Face 
in Africa; Enlightened Leaders or Savvy Strongmen?" had more muted 
responses about leaders who mostly rose out of the ranks of the military, 
acquired power through a coup or insurgency and have maintained politi­
cal power through continued militarization or authoritatively engineered 
civilianization.49 Buckley argues that the new breed of African leaders, are 
marked by other mutual characteristics including the fact that they have 
close relations with their major donors, drawing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in aid annually.� Apart from Museveni and Rawlings, other leaders 
applauded by the West at various periods in the past decade, had included 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, President Issaias Afwerki of 
Eritrea, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, President Laurent Kabila of Congo and 
so on. 
Monga's review of the remarkable creativity of political leaders is 
instrnctive. He notes that the rapidity with which they have deciphered 
the vocabulary of the new era has led to a new discourse centered on 
democracy. Within the range of these modernized techniques of political 
survival and exclusion, a nwnber of themes have found ready acceptance 
among the global intellectual and policy community such as; 'the popula­
tion is politically immature', 'the democratic process cannot be supported 
in the current state of economic underdevelopment', 'democracy must 
be informed by intrinsic cultural precepts' and so on. u. 1heir diplomatic 
sophistry is well matched by the acute insights of tl1e citizenry. Irrespective 
of their reception in global arenas, the failure of governments to live up to 
the electoral (or coup) promises of rapid change, political liberalization and 
human rights protection, continues to attract a range of critical responses 
from African citizenry: from violent resistance to wry political humor as 
in the many jokes of unknown authorship circulating daily on the virtual 
sites of African scholars and dtizens: 
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Once at a conference, three scientists: an American, a German 
and a Nigt."li.an, were talking and bragging about the techno­
logical advances of their respective countries in the field of 
medicine. 
Says the American, "In Washington, there was a baby boy 
born without forearms, so we attached artificial forearms on 
him. Now that he is grown, he is an Olympic boxer and a gold 
medalist at that!" 
The German replied, "That's nothing to what we have done. 
Back in Berlin, there was a baby girl born without legs, we 
attached artificial legs on her, and she is now a 3 times Olym­
pics marathon gold medalist!!" 
The Nigerian interjected laughing. "Is that all you have 
done, and just a gold medalist? In Abeokuta, we had a baby boy 
born without a head. We attached a coconut to his neck and he 
is now the president of Nigeria! 
THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL CONSENSUS AND 
AFRICA'S POLITICAL RENEWAL 
While the end of the cold war supposedly shattered the tacit assump­
tion that self-contained economic reconstruction could advance without 
corresponding political change, industrial countries still send mixed mes­
sages to Africa as Harbeson and other scholars concur. They encourage 
integration with the global economy they dominate through multilateral 
channels {international financial institutions) while they discourage inte­
gration in bilateral relationships by retaining barriers to African partici­
pation. 52 Reflecting the cynicism of many observers, David Throup also
wrote, "Western governments, on paper strong supporters of democracy, 
inevitably balance their ... commitment to democracy with the desire 
for political stability and the pursuit of their national self-interest." As a 
result, he contends, "they're often inclined to accept friendly governments 
with dubious democratic credentials rather than to risk the instability and 
unpredictability that accompanies far-reaching change."53 
There is evidence of alliances between global capital and numerous 
African governments who understand the language of global economic 
restructuring and are prepared to speak it in exchange for the procure­
ment of external legitimacy. Ugandan Fmance Minister,Jehoash Mayanja 
Nkangi to thunderous applause from the global community, had noted 
at the tum of the millennium that his country has opened up the cur­
rency to the free market "so that it sells like cabbage". Indeed, Uganda was 
"rewarded for its performance. It became the first country to benefit from 
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debt relief offered by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund-dlrs 700 million was forgiven of its debt of dlrs 3.4 billion."54 
During US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright's week.long tour 
of selected African nations (including Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Angola, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe) at that same period, she acknowledged that 
the United States for more than three decades viewed Africa as little more 
than a disaster-prone Cold War battlefield but pledged ... to open a "new 
chapter" in relations with countries on the continent that promise to build 
democracy and free market economies. 55
In Albright's tour and later, President Clinton's tour which included 
a trip to Ghana, the constant theme was a call to "open markets, honest 
government and the rule of law". W hen challenged over the fact that 
that many of these regimes they supported were ruled by military fiat and 
decrees that justify the abrogation of rights and basic freedoms, US offi­
cials were reportedly quoted as saying, "We don't do Mary Robinson", an 
allusion to the U.N high commissioner for human rights. Indeed, other 
senior U.S officials have been cited as arguing that there is a need to allow 
national leaders whose security forces may seem excessively 'vigorous' to 
explain the need for force. 56 
"Market democracies" may appear to provide the economic resurgence 
urgently required across the continent, but it is alarming that the process 
of achieving such is veiled in allusions to "vigorous force" and readiness to 
accept the delimitation of the rights of democracy. Africa has been beset 
by global tides that affirm and alternately deny the desirability and feasibil­
ity of democratization for the continent. In their contribution to the early 
evolving discourse on African democracy and development, Rothchild and 
Ravenhill for instance concluded "It may well be that full democratization 
will have to await the construction of a strong economic base, and it is to 
the latter that priority should be given. But if the United States chooses 
this alternative, it should not prevent the promotion of other dimensions 
of basic human rights throughout Africa. "57
Like other such advocates, they fail to explain precisely how the United 
States will facilitate the emergence of authoritarian regimes devoted to 
economic reconstruction nor how the United States will ensure that "other 
dimensions of basic human rights" will be enforced under such benign 
autocrats. Faced with evidence of a deepening socio-economic crisis, the 
concession by a globalizing world has been the call for "good governance." 
But bilateral and multilateral donors seem yet to understand that African 
governments must derive their legitimacy primarily from domestic rather 
than international or multilateral sources. Some years back, the president 
of the World Bank pronounced in seemingly uncompromising terms: 
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'lhe development of many Sub-Saharan African countries has 
been quite unnecessarily constrained by their political systems ••• 
People need freedom to realize individual and collective 
potential .• I fear that many of Africa's leaders have been more 
concerned about retaining power than about the long-term 
development interests of their people. 1he cost to millions of 
Africans ... has been unforgivably high" .58
The result of such 'concerns' was the imposition of political condi­
tionality on aid to African governments, a step that has attracted heated 
debate with scholars such as Ihonvbere offering blunt criticisms of the role 
of foreign actors in the continental crises. "Political conditionality, with 
its emphasis on transparency, accountability, certainty and so on, enables 
donors, creditors and lenders to put pressure on recalcitrant and repressive 
leaders. But we cannot however overlook the fact that these same African 
leaders 'were in many instances, installed, nurtured and sustained over the 
years by the same Western leaders who. have now turned against them. 
Many African leaders have perfected the art of brutal and inhuman poli­
tics, divide-and-rule tactics, and a total commitment to the retention of 
power through the asphyxiation of civil society. 59 
Critics of political conditionality have emerged from various ideologi­
cal persuasions, with many revealing a distressing ignorance of the nature 
of democratic voice in Africa."° Todd Moss for instance, examined what he 
describes as the limits of liberal universalism and asked, "Is America really 
prepared to undertake a social engineering project so large as restructuring 
other nations and their cultural traits in order to match a desired liberal 
political order?"61 Moss reflects that problematic persuasion in which the 
values, concepts and structures of democracy are regarded as a uniquely 
Euro-American invention founded on purely western goals and 'traits'. 
1his indicates of course, a misreading of the troubled political history of 
the western world, but also reveals an inability to comprehend the long 
history of democratic socio-political values reflected in indigenous politi­
cal structures and contemporary struggles for political change across much 
of the African continent.62 Unfortunately, such puerile notions provide
grist for the rather sanctimonious 'let well alone' formulations of those 
who contend that African countries are too deeply invested in authoritar­
ian structures to engender democratic societal and policy processes. 
REVISITING THE FOOD OR VOTES DEBATE 
Amartya Sen has provided a vigorous challenge to the notion that 
economic development must come before democracy and the attempt to 
secure political rights. 63 While the subject of political rights has been on 
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the agenda of numerous international forums, it is still greeted by much 
skepticism veiled behind the seeming innocuous question; "Why bother 
about the finesse of democracy given the overpowering grossness of 
material need?"64 The belief that political rights correlate negatively with 
economic growth evades a number of relewnt issues and Sen argues that 
such a dichotomous view of the problem speaks of an incorrect way of 
understanding first, the force of economic needs and, second, the salience 
of political rights. The real issues involve taking note of extensive intercon­
nectedness between rights and needs-such connections are both instru­
mental and constitutive. 65 
H people are the agents of development-that is, those with the 
responsibility to decide what development is, what values it is 
to maximize, and the methods for realizing it-they must also 
have the prerogative of making public policy at all levels. They 
must not merely participate in the conventional sense of the 
word; they must be the ones to decide on how to proceed with 
social transformation. To be sure, up to a point it is possible for 
the people to be the means of development without the need 
for a democratic political system: the people can be coerced or 
manipulated to give their resources to promote their leaders 
notion of development. However, this process ... is oppressive 
and exploitative rather than emancipatory, and a process that is 
not emancipatory cannot be conducive to development ... Fmally 
if people are the end of development, then their well-being is the 
supreme law of development ... the only one way to ensure that 
social transformation is not dissociated from the well-being of 
the people is to institute democracy.66 
It is also important to remember that it is the years of dictatorial rule first 
by western colonial states and then their proteges that have produced the 
very situation for which autocrats are peddled as the cure. It is not surpris­
ing that it was not till the Asian crises of the late 1990s, that there was a 
decline in the call for "a benign, efficient dictatorship with the "appropri­
ate" macroeconomic framework for African countries".67 Scholars have
observed that there is a decided weakness in the process of causal empiri­
cism that supposedly underlies these generalizations about the impact 
of authoritarianism on prosperity68 and despite the character of political 
structures in Asia, it cannot be argued that authoritarianism is a necessary 
or sufficient condition for long-tern development in Africa. "69 Not surpris­
ingly, K.ieh argues that, "the neocolonial African state which has served as 
the conduit for repression, oppression and exploitation cannot play the role 
of purveyor of democracy . . .  , the neo-colonial state and its structures must 
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be transformed so that they serve the interests of the peoples of Africa, 
rather than those of the African ruling class and their external patrons. »1o 
A proper conceptualization of democracy certainly takes it beyond the 
procedural, electoral or polyarchic models so apparent in Africa's current 
transitions.71 Yet, Plattner and Gersham raise a strong defense even for
these relatively unsuccessful 'undemocratic' processes': 
'lhe new pessimists criticize the simplistic view that elections 
are sufficient to make a country free. But they commit the same 
fiillacy. failing to recognize that democratization is a process of 
transition, not an instant transformation to a new order ... 'lhe 
danger with elections, it is said is that they empower majorities 
that may favor policies motivated by ethnic or religious intol�­
ance or by short-term economic interests. 'lhis is a danger, but 
what is the alternative? 'lhe critics tend to suggest some version 
of what might be called "liberal nondemocracy.,--an unelected
government that preserves political stability, promotes economic 
development, observes the rule of law and generally respects the 
rights ofits subjects. In theory, such a benevolently authoritar­
ian government might be preferable to a corrupt and illiberal 
democracy. But where can we find one in the real world? 'lhe 
critics cite very few contemporary examples.72 
Confronted by 'dangerous sources of internal opposition' arising from 
their ruthless use of power and state resources as well as endemic eco­
nomic crisis, many African regimes have attempted to entrench them­
selves in power by using the machinery of state to suppress or co-opt any 
rival organization. 73 What is of great concern to domestic forces in the 
African continent is the fact that economic reform has given a number 
of regimes political legitimacy and reinforced their privileged positions 
as intermediaries between their societies and sources of external power.74 
In this position, they have been able to fully dictate the terms of political 
liberalization, that is the timing of reforms (if at all) and the manipula­
tion of the conditions and processes that would ensure their perpetuation, 
civilianization or maximization of influence on electoral outcomes. 
Virtually all the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have commenced 
some form of neo-liberal market reforms with Zaire, Togo, Mali, Uganda, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana on the list of the most 
prominent privatizing countries. The social impact of various liberaliza­
tion and privatization programs has aggravated domestic disequilibrium 
and deepened the crisis of poverty in much of the continent compelling 
the IMF and World Bank to launch the joint program (HIPC, Heavily 
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Indebted Poor Countries) intended to reward governments sustaining 
reform policies, by reducing their debt servicing burden. This is obviously 
welcome in many countries where governments expend four times as much 
on debt servicing as they do on social services. 
The earlier picture of economic renaissance lauded by Western analysts 
with regards to the economies of Uganda, Ghana, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo was clearly an incomplete one. In the Congo, after 
a drop in inflation from an astounding 24,000 percent under Mobutu to a 
mere 70 percent, under Kabila, the economy suffered major reversals due 
largely to a climate of intense political disaffection and turmoil; Ghana's 
success story is heavily underwritten by World Bank loans which make 
the country one of Africa's biggest borrowers, with aid amounting in 
some years to 11 percent of <:}DP; and World Bank officials have been 
repeatedly informed by lead economists and researchers in Uganda that 
the liberalization and privatization programs had destroyed jobs and local 
industries, impoverished producers of indigenous crops and worsened the 
general conditions of the poor.75
ENVISIONING NEW PATHWAYS FOR POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND CONSOUDATING 
CHANGE 
The evolving nature of global strategic interests exposes the fragility 
of notions of democratic waves that correspond only with broad global 
polarities and epochs. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
so-called third wave of democratic transitions, Africa Fund's Jennifer Davis 
provided a revealing analysis of the convoluted relationship between Amer­
ican policymakers, corporations and Nigeria's former military regime: 
What seems lacking now is not an analysis to support the 
imposition of sanctions, but rather the will to act to support 
democracy in Nigeria. The White House has avoided involv­
ing human rights and environmental groups in the current 
review process and Congress seems paralyzed by a combination 
of corporate lobbying and Nigerian influence buying. Recent 
reports raise concerns about whether illegal Nigerian cam­
paign contributions have touched the review process; there is 
certainly growing evidence of Nigerian payoffs to U.S religious 
and political leaders, although grassroots support for sanctions 
is still growing. 76 
The scope for concerted action is sti ll large even if the challenges are 
daunting. Sunkel acknowledges this in his analysis of Latin America, 
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"how can we impregnate capitalism with the public and social concerns of 
socialism without frightening the capitalist entrepreneur and at the same 
time avoid militarized bureaucratic authoritarianism of the right or the left 
and strive for more individual and social freedom? How can we avoid that 
the process toward transnational integration and the pressure for increased 
competitiveness lead to further national economic, social and cultural dis­
integration?"77 He suggests that the solution lies in a democratic structure 
strengthened by civil society and by increased support from the developed 
nations. Such support should take the form of increased access to their 
markets, decreased debt service and easier terms for technology transfer 
rather than the imposition of sweeping economic reform packages. 
Prezowski's conclusions provide an even more telling illustration of 
the frustration of observers, "Capitalism is irrational, socialism is unfea­
sible, in the real world people starve-the conclusions we have reached 
are not very encouraging" and in such a context he advocates a meeting 
of moderates from both camps to negotiate what may be at best some 
form of procedural democracy. 78 Beyond such ideological struggles, two 
aspects of the transitional process seem to beg urgent attention. Tue first is 
the process of sustaining and validating the struggle for political change. 
Indeed, the ability of democracy movements to sustain and mobilize for 
a long struggle and to attract internal and international support in the 
face of the economic maneuvers of reforms-oriented autocrats must be 
addressed more closely in research. The second is the post-electioneering 
confrontation with the immense challenges of consolidating democratic 
governance and sustaining new socio-political structures. 
Generating and sustaining popular support in the face of economic 
diplomacy by authoritarian regimes and their foreign partners demands 
ingenuity towards building a transparent, politically vibrant, stable and 
participatory polity. Indeed, the ascendancy of the market logic and the 
simultaneous deepening of poverty and large scale suffering across the 
continent suggest that even pro-democracy groups in Africa will face 
major challenges to validate their struggle and earn domestic legitimacy. 
Luckhead and White for instance argue that this requires "measures to 
prevent the continued dominance of unaccountable elites able to manipu­
late democratic institutions to their advantage as a result of low levels 
of popular participation and control Hence, the activities of democratic 
movements must involve practical involvement in critical arenas of com­
munity development and struggles for social justice and change. "79 AB activ­
ists and scholars address critical issues such as constitutionalism, political 
corruption and the refashioning of political institutions, such projects must 
also recognize that amidst the pressures of a globalizing age, the potentials 
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for democracy struggles in many parts of Africa to degenerate into violent 
conflict are very high. 
Attempts to prescribe for the future are inherently judgmental in that 
they necessarily legitimize particular processes at the expense of others. 
Nevertheless, we must give weight to the oft ignored transformations 
occurring at the societal level and in other public spaces. These dynam­
ics are too often ignored in analyses that imagine tidal waves of apathy 
and change occurring in the African polity. Across the continent, politi­
cal struggles have centered on the need to reconstruct the colonial and 
postcolonial state, transforming the nature and use of power and creat­
ing a political process that is sustainable in its task of responding to the 
complex socio-political and economic interests of its constituents. Few 
analysts would gainsay the reality of multiple failures in that regard,� the 
continuity of resistance and mobilizations are remarkable testaments to 
the vibrant quest for voice and rights in Africa's socio-political landscape. 
Such accomplishments remind us of the complexities and contradictions in 
the relationship between procedural political changes marked by elections 
and the social forces that facilitate them. While elections are of critical 
importance, they do not of themselves nullify the power alignments which 
all too often reproduce and facilitate the suppression of political voice and 
popular participation. Indeed, they may serve to reinforce domestic and 
global hierarchies that are inimical to political democratization at its most 
meaningful level. 
An important illustration of the continuity of social forces in struggles 
for democratic change can be seen in the area of women's equality. It 
would seem axiomatic to many observers that in a continent marked by 
turbulence and economic privations, African women must be systemati­
cally oppressed within the cultural realm and also marginalized in political 
calculus. However, in addition to the wealth of literature that offers an 
exciting perspective on indigenous women's mobilization and voice, 80 for 
the past few years, the global data on women in parliament, collated by 
the lnterparliamentary Union has provided fascinating insights for those 
interested in examining the complexities of politics, liberalizing spaces, 
institutions and democratic empowerment across the world. Almost unbe­
lievably, Rwanda, a country recovering from the horrors of genocide has 
been ranked first in the world with over 30 percent of women in parlia­
ment, a position it has consistently held for some years now and of course, 
Liberia's President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, recently became another of the 
continent's female heads of government. 
In sharp contrast, it is clear that while its stable democratic state with 
established modes of political renewal, electioneering and constitutional 
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governance might have gradually supported the enlargement of the divi­
dends of social and economic progress in the United States, it has not 
necessarily translated into increased political access and power for Ameri­
can women. The United States for instance, in 2006 ranks at number 66 
of a global classification of percentages of women in National ·Parliament 
trailing behind about 76 countries, including numerous African countries: 
Mozambique, South Africa, Seychelles, Namibia, Uganda, Tunisia, Tan­
zania, Ethiopia, Guinea, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe. 81 It
is closely ranked within the range occupied by countries devastated by 
warfare, poverty and political instability, including Angola, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, Guinea Bissau and Malawi. 
What do we make of such a mixed balance sheet? How does it moder­
ate the ostensible goals of"consolidating" change? How do we define the 
nature of changes that should be consolidated within the emerging politi­
cal system and the social institutions that support and define such a state? 
Aside from the deserved pride and jubilations that should accompany. 
the political, ideological, cultural and social accomplishments of growing 
female representation in the political institutions of several African coun­
tries, we must perhaps confront the fact that political access and power 
does not necessarily translate into broad based social and economic rights, 
well being and protection for all women. 
These layered realities assist us in understanding the ways in which 
myriad factors, including decisive contemporary political agenda setting, 
historic legacies of political rights to voice and participation within the 
indigenous political arenas or even the turbulent aftermath of conflict and 
destabilization are involved in recreating a propitious terrain for change. At 
the same time, seemingly 'advanced' democracies can become impervious 
to reform as the lliusion of'social and economic security', the institutional­
ization and consolidation of prohibitive democratic processes and the 'rule 
of law" neutralize popular democratic voice and normalize marginalization 
in affluent societies such as the United States. 
Such contradictions unsettle our packaged concepts of democracy 
and also serve as a discomfiting reminder of the necessity of establishing 
priorities and creating a system capable of measuring progress toward soci­
etal goals. Do we measure the percentage of women in parliament, or less 
tangible indicators of silencing and marginalization, the status oflaws that 
enfranchise or defraud citizenry rights, the success or failure of citizens in 
securing and utilizing political access for palpable democratic gains, the 
success of the rule of law in transforming prevailing cultures of domination, 
inequity and abuse or the role of ongoing social resistance in displacing and 
transforming such structures and hierarchies at local and national levels? 
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By insistently reviewing and revealing the hidden, urgent or more 
subtle mechanisms and agencies t:Qa.t define and mediate the politics and 
search for effective governance in African countries, the contributors to 
this volume have drawn us even closer to an understanding of the problems 
and prospects of transitions and possibilities for sustained political trans­
formation in Africa. Notwithstanding the wealth of analyses of the nature, 
dimens.ions and historicity of political transitions in Africa, most scholars 
remain constantly taxed by the reality of a terrain that rarely responds to 
Western formulaic conceptualizations of change. The immense economic, 
social, religious and cultural diversities within the African continent act as 
a constant reminder that as we inch our way forward in research, it would 
be a grave error to suppose that the primary challenge is simply one of 
description, of conceptualizing crises and conjuring explanatory variables. 
What modes of governance can reverse the trends towards destabiliza­
tion and polarization along religious, ethnic and other lines in the African 
continent? How can the state be transformed from dancing attendance 
on externally derived legitimacy to becoming accountable to a citizenry 
empowered to participate in an agenda setting process that seeks to meet 
the socio-economic needs of the population?82 
Political transitions to deepened democratic realities must ultimately 
yield substantive outcomes in how governments, organizations and com­
munities do business within and with one another. With this in mind, 
it is hardly surprising that African scholars have repeatedly emphasized 
the role of institutions in agenda setting, in mediating the use of political 
power even in situations of perceived justifiable illiberality, in setting the 
rules that can guide, define and legislate on rights, citizenship and protec­
tions and can create a transformed public space.83 Within the constitution 
making and peace building agendas advocated by several analysts, it is pos­
sible to envisage the emergence of multi.ethnic communities that have a 
sense of citizenship rights and integrated nationalisms. 
Clearly there is a need to recreate institutional frameworks that repo­
sition individuals in spaces that are protective of their entitlements to voice 
and basic rights. As Beckman and Jega have reminded us, the actions of 
societal institutions and movements become relevant to democratization, 
first of all, if and when they contest relations of domination within their 
own fields of operation.84 lt is important that we continue to analyze the 
impact of global marginalization(s), economic privations, state repres­
sion and the vibrant counter-culture of resistance on the democratization 
process. The facilitation of voice is a salient aspect of democratization as 
it embraces the "emergence of counter-narratives that are crucial for the 
democratization of various sites in society"85 and addresses the forms of
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silencing that makes communities and individuals subject to theories and 
processes in which discrimination and oppression are 'natural' outcomes of 
a search for economic growth and global competition. 
The process toward such end-goals is strewn with major co�ts 
but such challenges must be viewed in tandem with the irrepressible vital­
ity of the socio-political landscape. In this light, volatility is not necessarily 
evidence of deviance or the failure of popular democratic ethos, but is often 
embedded within the democratizing trajectory of the nation and projected 
in response to surrounding socio-economic contexts, needs and pressures. 
Together, these realities offer a compelling argument for the success of 
serious efforts to construct the requisite scaffolding that will effectively 
anchor the political processes underway in several African countries 
toward the rule of just law, political accountability, popular participation, 
restructuring of power relations and socio-economic empowerment. 
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